President Gustavo Petro uses the expression “golpe blando” to mean a style of soft coup-d’état that doesn’t involve force, massive street demonstrations or the actual ouster of a president. Rather, under this concept, the seizure of power can occur subtly, via legal initiatives, investigations for purported wrongdoing and allegations of rogue campaign financing that, sooner or later, can make remaining in the presidency untenable. Petro cherishes this sort of conspiracy theory. A mixture of paranoia and worst-case-scenario analysis, it seems to be a centerpiece of his administration. He contends that ousted Peruvian president Pedro Castillo, for example, was a “golpe blando” victim.
When Petro perceived that the Attorney General’s office was about to move against him over alleged campaign finance irregularities, he called for demonstrators to gather at the Supreme Court of Justice, which is charged with naming a new Attorney General (Petro later denied calling for the demonstration). For some, this episode brought back some of the worst memories of recent Colombian history, linked to the 1985 armed attack of then-M19 guerrilla group against the Justice Palace. Petro once belonged to M19. This was a painful déjà vu for Colombians, and a revealing episode that lays bare a backbone of the Petro administration. If worse comes to worst, contentious issues could have been be decided in the streets, where Petro believes his followers hold sway. The Supreme Court took its time in choosing a new AG, from a slate of three candidates proposed by Petro himself, but finally appointed Luz Adriana Camargo. Her name was well received.
Likewise, there were many reactions to President Gustavo Petro’s idea of convening a Constitutional Assembly. Possibly the most synthesizing one came from constitutional lawyer Juan Manuel Charry, who wrote that Petro doesn’t know whether his role is to subvert the institutional order or to govern (“no sabe si subvertir o gobernar”). Another analyst suggested that the president is basically notifying Colombians that he’s unwilling to use the established rules for changing the Constitution. Yet others argued that, since the president lacks a majority in Congress, he’s announcing that he won’t depend upon that body.
According to Petro, “Colombian institutions are failing the Constitution and the people” — so the Constitution must be changed. His novel procedure would be to convene “open town hall meetings [for] mobilizing people” to “purify our institutions … convoking the people, and not the mafias.”
A direct consequence of this unprecedented and off-off Broadway approach to writing a new Constitution is that reforms would be pursued not through Congress, but via Constitutional Assembly deliberations. Relations between the Executive branch and Congress would grow further strained, to put it mildly. That’s why the president of Congress, Iván Name, reacted angrily to Petro’s proposal. He demanded that Petro work through Congress. He even warned the president that the Armed Forces would align with the defense of Colombian institutions, and aren’t subject to manipulation by Petro.
As sad and weird as these events are, we should focus on Colombia’s historical trajectory, and treat Petro’s Constitutional Assembly proposal as one big charade. Colombian institutions would hardly accommodate the disruptive procedures of the president’s idea. But things won’t return to normal soon, since Petro will likely strive to save face. Though this situation won’t get better until it gets worse, we don’t want to speculate on how it will eventually play out: we’re in uncharted waters.
